Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. i4 Solutions, Inc. : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven Rinehart; Attorney for Defendant.
Richard R. Golden, James A. McIntyre; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Robertson\'s Marine v. i4 Solutions, No. 20080962 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1314

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERTSON'S MARINE, INC.,
Appellee/Cross Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20080962 - SC

vs.

District Court Case No. 060904460

i4 SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Appellant/Cross Appellee.

On Appeal From a Final Order of Judgment by the Th|rd Judicial District Court
The Honorable Robert Faust
BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

Steven Rinehart 11494
Steven L. Rinehart, LLC
707 West 700 South, Suite 201
Woods Cross, UT 84087
(801)347-5173
steve@uspatentlaw.us
Attorney for Defendant /Appellant, 14
Solutions, Inc.

Richard R. (Solden 5957
James A. Mclntyre 2196
Mclntyre & bolden, P.C.
3838 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
(801)266-3$99
litigation@mcintyre-golderi.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff / Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, Robertson's Marine, Inc.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUN 2 6 2009

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERTSON'S MARINE, INC.,
Appellee/Cross Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20080962 - SC

vs.

District Court Case No. 060904460

i4 SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Appellant/Cross Appellee.

On Appeal From a Final Order of Judgment by the Third Judicial District Court
The Honorable Robert Faust
BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

Steven Rinehart 11494
Steven L. Rinehart, LLC
707 West 700 South, Suite 201
Woods Cross, UT 84087
(801)347-5173
steve@uspatentlaw.us
Attorney for Defendant /Appellant, i4
Solutions, Inc.

Richard R. Golden 5957
James A. Mclntyre 2196
Mclntyre & Golden, P.C.
3838 South West Temple
Salt Lake C i k u T 84115
(801) 266-3399
litigation@DJicintyre-golden.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff / Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, Robertson's Marine, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

Nature of the case

4

Course of the proceedings

5

Disposition at trial

5

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

9

I.

i4 Omits an Issue And Standard of Review And, Therefore, Fails to Properly
Support its Case
9

II.

i4 is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Because it Did Not Prevail on Its Contract
Claims
12

III.

The Trial Court's Refusal to Rule That i4 Prevailed on its Contract Claim Was
No Oversight
15

IV.

i4fs Analyses Regarding Prevailing Parties is Incorrect

17

A.

i4 Did Not Prevail Under the Contract.

18

B.

There May Be Simultaneous Winner$ or Losers With no Party
Prevailing
20
k

i

C.

i4 Had no Breach of Contract Claim Bepause There Was no Breach.
21

D.

Attorney Fees Are Not Awarded For Prevailing in Unjust Enrichment.
22

V.

Public Policy Does Not Compel Awarding Attorney Fees to i4

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL

23

25

I.

Unjust Enrichment Does Not Apply Because ifhere is an Express Contract.
25

II.

Robertson's Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees Because I4's Appeal Is Based
on the Contract
26

III.

The Factual Findings do Not Support The Legal Conclusion That Robertson's
Was Unjustly Enriched
30
A.

There Is No Finding That a Benefit Was Conferred

31

B.

There is No Finding That Robertson's Appreciated or Had Knowledge
of the Benefit
33

C.

There is no Finding That Robertson's Accepted or Retained a Benefit
33

CONCLUSION

34

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES:
A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47

18, 20, 25

Allen v. Hall, 2006 UT 70

30

American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) . . . 25, 32, 33
Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996)

12

Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20

13

Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26

24, 29

Bonneville Distrib. Co. v. Green River Dev. Assocs., 2007 UT App 175
Carlson Distrib. Co., 2004 UT App 227

20
1,10

CCD, L.C v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42

22

DesertMiriah, Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 2000 UT 83

30

Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988)
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976)

27-29
27

Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co., v Ross., 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . . . . 21
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986)
Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85
Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998)

15, 20
2
10, 15

Glacier Land Co., L.L. C. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., L.L. C.\, 2006 UT App 516
Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67
J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2007 UT App 88
Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 31 U 9 (ajfd 2000 UT 56)
iii

3
4, 17
25
4

Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 Pi .2d 406 (Utah 1980) . 27-29
Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978)
Meadowbrook, L.L.C. v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998)

26
3,20

Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 20, 21,
25
Needham v. First Nat. Bank, 85 P.2d 785 (Utah 1938) . . . H

30

Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79

12

Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App.
1994)

11

Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983)

30, 31

Paster, Gould, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

2, 11

Paulde GrootBldg. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20

1,10

ProMax, 943 P.2d247 (Utah Ct. App.1997)

2, 11

R.T. Nielson v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 P.3d 1119

1, 10, 17

Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351

17, 18, 20

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991)

11

SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2008 UT App 31

25

Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44

10

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., 279 P.2d 7^09 (Utah 1955)

27

Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984)

21

Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37

K

Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102

>
iv

12
1,10

Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

26

FEDERAL CASES:
Tax Track Sys. Corp. v New Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2007) . . . . 22, 23
STATE STATUTES:
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008)

,

Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008)

24
1

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826 (2008)

4,24,29

RULES:
Utah R. Civ. P. 52

30

V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear thjis appeal by virtue of the pour
over order of the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008).
ISSUES PRESENTED

On Appeal: The issues on Appellant's appeal largely involve a contractual
provision for attorney fees, so the first inquiry is which party, if any, prevailed on contract
claims, with the other issues being subsidiary to that. Accordingly, the issues are:
a.

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in determining that neither

Appellant i4 nor Appellee Robertson's were prevailing parties in their mutual
breach of contract claims against each other.
Standard of review: "Whether a party is the prevailing party in an action is
a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial courtl and reviewed for an abuse
of discretion." Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 2004 UT App
227,116 (citing UT. Nielson, Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, f 25, 40 P.3d 1119); see
Paul deGrootBldg. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, ^[18 ("The award of
attorney fees is typically a matter of law, which we review for correctness. This,
however, is not true where the fees are predicated upoji findings of fact, in which
case we review the award of fees for an abuse of discretion") (internal citations to
Cook, {supra) and Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 p T 102,121 omitted).
To the extent that i4 argues, as it must, that the trial court erred in declining
to find that Robertson's breached the contract (that is, in finding the Robertson's

did not breach), such a finding should be reviewed under the clear error standard.
Findings will be upheld unless the finding is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or the appellate court reaches "a firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.1997). The
party asserting the lack of evidentiary support must marshal the evidence
supporting the finding and demonstrate that it is insufficient. Id; Pasker, Gould,
Ames & Weavery Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994).

b.

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in determining that neither party

should be awarded attorney fees, where no party prevailed on contract claims, but
the prevailing party prevailed only on an unjust enrichment claim.
Standard of review: "As a general rule, attorney fees may be awarded only
when they are authorized by statute or contract." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust,
2004 UT 85, f23 {citing Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). "Whether
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review for
correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, f22 {quoting
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).

On Cross Appeal: The issues on Cross Appeal deal with whether the trial court
was correct in granting judgment to Appellant i4 based on unjust enrichment and whether
this Court should award Robertson's its attorney fees in this appeal for defending against
i4's appeal for attorney fees under the contract:

c.

Issue: Whether the trial court could conclude |hat i4 was entitled to

judgment based on unjust enrichment, where there was an express contract dealing
with the identical subject matter.
Standard of review: Whether the trial court's jlegal conclusion was correct
is a question of law, which is reviewed for "correctness, granting no deference to
the trial judge's legal determinations." Glacier Land\Co., LLC
&Assocs., LLC,

v. Claudia Klawe

2006 UT App 516, fl4 (quotingHeadowbrook, LLC

v.

Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998).

d.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals should award Robertson's its

reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending againslj i4's appeal, which is its only
issue and which is based solely on the contractual provision for attorney fees.
Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which at this stage is not
reviewable

e.

Issue: Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to support

the legal conclusions that i4 prevailed on a theory of uhjust enrichment.1
Standard of review: Whether the trial court's findings of fact are sufficient
to support its decision is reviewed under a clearly errotieous standard: "[T]he

Those factual elements being (1) a benefit conferred, Q knowledge or appreciation
of the benefit and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit u d r circumstances that would
be unjust unless Robertson's paid the reasonable value thereo
3

court must set forth the reasons for its decision in enough detail for the reviewing
court to determine whether they are clearly erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999
UT App 3 H 9, 973 P2d 445, 448 (affd 2000 UT 56); but see Groberg v. Horn.
Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, f 12 ("Whether a claimant has been unjustly
enriched is a mixed question of law and fact. We uphold a lower court's findings of
fact unless the evidence supporting them is so lacking that we must conclude the
finding is clearly erroneous. Furthermore, we afford broad discretion to the trial
court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts.")

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008):
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action
based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April
28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing
allow at least one party to recover attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case:
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake
Department, in a case involving a contract to create a website. The parties each claimed
the other had breached the contract between them or, in the alternative that the other had
been unjustly enriched. Appellee Robertson's complaint alleged Appellant i4 breached
its agreement with Robertson's by failing to timely create a website and provide it to
Robertson's. In the alternative Robertson's alleged i4 was unjustly enriched by receiving
4

payment for the website without providing it. i4fs counterclaim alleged Robertson's
breached the contract or that Robertson's was unjustly enricDied.
Course of the proceedings:
Bench trial was held on August 28, 2008, after whichthe trial court took the matter
under advisement. The trial court then entered its minute entty ruling on September 3,
2008, which granted judgment in favor of i4 on only its unju$t enrichment claim, with
each party to bear its own attorney fees and costs.
i4 then filed a post-trial motion for attorney fees on September 8, 2008. By minute
entry dated October 2, 2008, the trial court declined to find tbat i4 prevailed on its
contract claim, which i4 had requested, and declined to change its ruling on the issue of
attorney fees. i4 then drafted findings of fact and conclusion^ of law and the judgment.
Disposition at trial:
The trial court found in favor of i4 on its claim of unjust enrichment, awarding it
$1,800, but the court declined to find that either party prevailed on the contract claims.
The trial court ordered each party to cover their own attorney| fees and costs.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS2
1.

Appellee Robertson's is a local retail seller of b0ats and related marine

products. Because it desired to enhance its presence in the electronic marketplace, in

2

Because thefindingsof fact prepared by i4 were so limited and simply parroted the trial
court's minute entry ruling, many of the facts are drawn from the trial transcript ("Tr."). Unless
noted otherwise, those facts are believed to be uncontested.
5

April 2005, it contracted with Appellant i4 to create a new website for it. R. 294 Tr. p.p.
14-15
2.

The contract provided that Robertson's would pay half the contract amount

down, which.it paid, with the balance due "when the site has been completed and
approved." R. 32 and 233; R. 294 Tr. p. 121.
3.

The contract was silent as to an exact completion date, but Robertson's

anticipated i4 would have the website completed so that Robertson's could use it by
midsummer 2005. R. 32 - 42; R. 294 Tr. p. 261.
4.

By December 2005, well after the boating season had ended, Robertson's

still did not have a website. Robertson's lost substantial business because of the delay.
See R. 294, Tr. P. 92.
5.

Having lost the whole season, Robertson's demanded a refund of the 50% it

had paid on the contract. R. 294 Tr 21,1.1. 21-23 (and trial exhibit #9).
6.

i4 refused to refund, and Robertson's filed suit for breach of contract for

failing to create the website, and for unjust enrichment on March 15, 2006. R. 1 - 3.
7.

i4 counterclaimed, likewise, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

R. 14 - 27.
8.

After bench trial in August 2008, the trial court took the matter under

advisement and then entered a minute entry ruling in favor of i4 on its unjust enrichment
claim and that claim only. The trial court ordered each party to bear its own costs and
attorney fees and directed i4 to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with the trial court's decision. R. 233 - 235.
6

9.

Before doing so, i4 moved for attorney fees, arguing much as it does here

that the trial court should have found it to have prevailed on|it contract claims and so
should have awarded i4 attorney fees. R. 237 - 251. The trial court declined to do so. R.
269. i4 then prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions |of Law and the Judgment. R.
275 - 280. i4 timely appealed, upon which Robertson's cros$-appealed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

On Appeal:
The standard of review Appellant i4 uses is incorrect because i4 has conflated two
issues into one. Because i4fs argument involves a contractual provision for attorney fees,
the first issue is which party, if any, prevailed on contract claims This issue merits
significant deference to the trial court. Once the proper standards of review are applied,
it is clear that the trial did not err. i4 did not and could not pitevail on its breach of
contract claim and, without the contractual provision for attorney fees, there was no
lawful basis for awarding attorney fees. Because whether Robertson's breached is a
factual determination, i4 should marshal the evidence supporting a finding that
Robertson's did not breach. Then it should demonstrate that this evidence is contrary to
such a findng. i4 does not do so,
The trial court did not just "disregard the contract." Despite i4fs requests that it
reconsider, the trial court declined to rule or conclude that either party prevailed on its
contact claims against the other party. As to i4fs contract clai^n, that conclusion was
correct because the trial court never made a finding that Robertson's breached. Although
7

the trial court did not state it expressly, the record evidence shows that Robertson's could
not have breached because the only performance required of it was payment. Payment,
however, was contingent on two conditions precedent: (1) that the website was completed
and (2) that Robertson's approved it. The trial court never found that either of these
conditions were satisfied, which was consistent with the evidence.
i4fs analyses claiming it is a prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney
fees is flawed. Admittedly Utah statute §78B-5-826 provides that a "court may award
attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon contract when the
contract allow[s] at least one party to recover attorney fees" (portions omitted). But
neither that statute nor any case says the court must award such fees. Nor does any case
authorize the award of fees absent a finding that a party prevailed on that contract.
i4 claims it "defeated" Robertson's contract claims. But the trial court did not
make that finding, nor did it find i4 to be a prevailing party under the contract. Attorney
fees are not recoverable for claims sounding in unjust enrichment. Labels aside, what the
trial court ordered did not conform to the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Rather, what the
trial court did (and which no party requested) was to reform the contract de facto and
order specific performance of its reformed version. As such, if there was any prevailing
party, it would have been Robertson's, and it should have been awarded fees if anyone.
Utah law recognizes that there may be simultaneous winners or losers and that no
party prevailed. Thus, absent a finding that i4 prevailed on its contract claims, the trial
court could not award attorney fees and did not abuse its discretion in not awarding fees
to i4. Finally, i4fs "public policy" argument is nothing more than i4fs subjective view of
8

this particular case and lacks any general application. If attorney fees need to be
apportioned as a matter of public policy to address improper! litigation, tools to do so
already exist.
On Cross-Appeal:
The trial court erred in awarding i4 judgment based on unjust enrichment for
several reasons, the most obvious being that the remedy of utijust enrichment is not
available if an explicit contract exits.
Robertson's should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees in defending against
i4Ts appeal, which seeks only one thing: attorney fee under the contract. Utah statute
provides that where one side to an agreement can recover such fees, the other side should
be able to as well. Moreover, Utah case law hold that contractual provisions for attorney
fees should extend to the appellate process as well. To do otherwise diminishes the
contractual rights to a party who is successful on appeal. Finally, the trial court failed to
make the factual findings necessary to support a legal conclusion that i4 prevailed based
on unjust enrichment.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

I.

i4 Omits an Issue And Standard of Review And, Therefore, Fails to
Properly Support its Case.

This case involves a contractual attorney fee provision^ which i4 incorrectly
analyzes in its choice of issues and standards of review. i4fs Initial Brief states the sole
issue as "[d]id the trial court incorrectly disregard the contract and should attorney fees
and costs have been awarded to i4 Solutions." Op. Br. p. vi. jThis is really two issues and
9

i4 erroneously combines the issues of (1) which party prevailed on its claims in contract
(if any) and, (2) the trial court's failure to award attorney fees to i4 as if they were one
issue.
As a result, i4 also misstates the proper standard or review. The correct analysis
should first focus whether any party prevailed on its contract claim against the other.
"Whether a party is the prevailing party in an action is a decision left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Carlson Distrib. Co.
v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C, 2004 UT App 227, f 16 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (citing R.T.
Nielson, Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, P25, 40 P.3d 1119). "Which party is the prevailing
party . . . . depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is
appropriate to leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial court."
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ^27 quoting R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,1f 25,
40P.3dlll9.
If neither party prevailed on its contract claim at trial, the attorney fees provision
in the contract is irrelevant, because attorney fees are only warranted in Utah when
provided for by contract or statute. Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). So
although an award of attorney fees is typically a matter of law reviewed for correctness as
i4 posits, that "is not true where the fees are predicated upon findings of fact, in which
case we review the award of fees for an abuse of discretion." Paul deGroot Bldg. Servs.,
LLC

v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, Tfl8 (citing R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, fl6,

40 P.3d 1119 and Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102,121, 20 P.3d 868). The
real issue for purposes of i4fs appeal is simply whether the trial court was correct in
10

declining to find that i4 prevailed on its contract claims. And the standard of review i4
proposes is incorrect.
In essence, i4 contests the trial court's de facto determination that Robertsons' was
not in breach of the contract. Whether a party materially breached a contract is a question
of fact. See Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & \Prug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445,
458 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (whether party breached lease is a question of fact.) Typically,
if one assails a court's factual determination, it is required to marshal the evidence in
support of that finding and demonstrate that it is insufficient. ProMax Dev. Corp. v.
Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997); Poster, Gouli Ames & Weaver, Inc. v.
Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994).
"If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds tol a review of the accuracy of
the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). Here, however, i4 doesn't even attempt to
marshal the evidence. It does not really contest any of the trial court's factual
determinations or its failure to make the factual determinations i4 wanted, nor does it
argue factual determinations were not supported by the evidence. Rather, it simply
argues the trial court "found each of the elements [for i4?s] breach of contract claims in its
findings of fact" (Op. Brief p. 3; id. p. 9) and argues that it was a prevailing party in
contract.
But there is no finding that Robertson's breached the contract either in the court's
minute entry ruling (R. 233 -235) or the Findings of Fact drafted by i4 on the trial court's
n

behalf. R. 275 - 277. If 14 truly believed the court made such a finding, it was incumbent
upon i4 to insert it into the Findings of Fact when it prepared them. It did not and cannot
now complain that it is absent. I4fs belated assertion that such a finding should be there is
akin to relying on invited error. Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, ^[14
("The invited error doctrine prohibits parties from 'taking advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error'") (quoting
Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, f 12, 163 P.3d 615).
Based on just i4fs failure to marshal the evidence and the error it has invited, this
Court should rule against i4. As shown below, however, even had it tried to marshal
evidence, i4 would have failed because ample evidence showed Robertson's did not
breach.
II,

i4 is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Because it Did Not Prevail on Its
Contract Claims.

The main thrust of i4?s arguments on appeal is that it prevailed in contract, which
contained an attorneys' fee provision, so the trial court should have awarded it attorney
fees as a prevailing party. The trial court, however, refused to find that either party
prevailed or that Robertson's breached the contract. That determination is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. "An appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent an
erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's
ruling." Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996) (in the context of discovery).
There was no abuse of discretion because the trial court's refusal to conclude that
i4 prevailed on its contract claim was amply supported by the evidence. What i4 fails to

12

appreciate is that in addition to showing that it performed or| even substantially performed
under the contract, i4 had to also show that Robertson's breached. See Bair v. Axiom
Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, f 14 (noting the third element in & breach of contract claim is a
breach by the other party).
Admittedly, evidence showed that i4 performed many (though not all) its duties
under the agreement and the trial court concluded as much. Kg. R. 233 -244 (i4
"completed the majority of the work" but the calculator was hot finished). However,
even assuming that the evidence supported a conclusion that |i4 substantially performed
the agreement (albeit well after the boating season), it does n|ot follow that Robertson's
breached. That is because Robertson's had only one duty un$er the agreement, which
was to pay the remaining balance of $3,275.00. That duty was triggered under the
contract as follows:
PAYMENT OPTIONS
For your convenience, i4 Solutions offers two paymerit options
*
50/50: You pay 50% of the total website cost at the time of signing,
and the remaining 50% when the site has been completed and
approved.
*
Web Leasing: You can make six (6) payments over a period of six
(6) months. The initial payment is due at the time of signing.
Monthly payment amounts for each website component are listed
below the total component amount.
Defendant i4fs Trial Exhibit #2 (Addendum 1).
Robertson's was offered and chose the 50/50 option. TfJo party claimed this
payment provision was ambiguous or that it meant something else, and Robertson's
understood it to mean just what it said - that is, the remaining (payment was due "when the
site [was] completed and approved." R. 294, Tr. p. 23 1.1. 9-18. The evidence showed,
13

however, that the site was never approved and i4 conceded as much at trial. See R 294
Tr p. 122 1.1. 2 - 5 (i4fs co-owner conceding the website had not been approved).
The other condition precedent was completion. The contract was i4's form
contract and drafted by it. i4 chose its conditions precedent and it did not choose
"substantially" or "materially" completed as a condition. When coupled with the fact that
the other condition was approval, one must conclude that unless there was an approval of
partial completion, the condition was full completion. The website had not been
completed because it was missing the calculator. See id. p. 140 1.1. 9 - 15 (i4 conceding
the calculator could not be found). Because the conditions precedent to Robertson's duty
to perform were not met, there was no basis for finding a breach by Robertson's.
Moreover, logically for the website to have been approved, i4 had to have made
something akin to a "delivery" of the site. But the trial court concluded that any delivery
was delayed. Indeed, even at trial, much later, the website was not complete and,
although clearly a password was required for Robertson's to manipulate the website, there
was no proper evidence or finding that i4 had given the password to Robertson's.3
Absent such delivery, there was nothing that Robertson's could have approved.
The trial court's own questioning showed that it felt that for delivery to be
effective, i4 had to provide Robertson's with "an administrative-type password to have
the ability to access to change the information on the web site." R. 294 Tr p. 105 1.1.17 21; see id. p. 84 (where trial court states "I mean, I got the point; he didn't change the text

3

To a certain extent this factor also relates to whether i4 fully performed its contractual
duties or had a claim for unjust enrichment.
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on the website. He knew he potentially had the ability but np password to do it"). The
fact that no password was provided to Robertson's is further| supported by the trial court's
minute entry decision, which ordered i4 to take any further sf:eps necessary to tender all
rights and access to the website to Robertson's. R. 235,27^.
In sum, there was substantial evidence from which th£ trial court could have
concluded that Robertson's did not breach the agreement. Where a party prevails in
unjust enrichment, not on contract, Utah law does not provide for the recoupment of
attorney fees. In fact, Utah law is to the contrary, providing that absent very special
situations,4 attorney fees are recoverable only where authorised by statute or contract.
Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). And where it is leased on contract, "[a]n
award of attorney fees is improper when it is not based on the terms contained in the
parties' agreement or where the breach is not based on contract." Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986). Without a determination that Robertson's
breached, there can be no finding that i4 prevailed on its contract claims.
III.

The Trial Court's Refusal to Rule That i4 Prevailed on its Contract
Claim Was No Oversight.

Perhaps the trial court should have specifically stated that neither party prevailed
on its contract claims, but it did not just "disregard the contract" as i4 frames the issue
(Op. Brief p. vi). i4 cannot complain on that point, however, |for it drafted the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. But the trial court's refusal to tule in i4's contract claim
was not accidental. It was faced with the issue in the pleadings and at trial. For purposes

4

E.g. plaintiffs as private attorneys general.
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of attorney fees, it arose when counsel requested fees in closing argument, noting that
there was a contractual provision for fees. R. 294, Tr. p. 162 1.1. 8 - 20. The trial court
then took the whole matter under advisement and ultimately concluded by its minute
entry of September 3, 2008, that i4 had "proven the elements of its claim for unjust
enrichment." R. 233. It did not award damages in contract, nor did it find that either
party had prevailed in contract or even that any side had breached. R.233 - 236.
Consequently, "[e]ach side [was] ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs" R.
236.
Before the minute entry, while the matter was under advisement, i4 again argued
its case - i.e. that it had prevailed in contract - by filing its unsolicited "Defendant's
Supplemental Trial Memorandum (Post-Trial)." R.210 - 213. Notably, all parties also
filed requests for and affidavits of attorneys' fees, so the issue of fees and contract were
squarely before the trial court. See generally R. 214 - 232. Then, after the trial court
issued its September 3, 2008, minute entry ruling, i4 filed still another motion and
memorandum, again entreating the trial court to find that i4 had prevailed in contract and,
therefore, should be awarded attorneys' fees. R. 237 -248 (Defendant's Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and memorandum in support). As here, the thrust of that motion was that
i4 should be awarded attorneys' fees because i4 prevailed on "[Robertson's] contract
claim and because [i4] prevailed on its own claims." R. 0240.
The trial court rejected i4?s defacto requests for reconsideration, no doubt because
the Court weighed the evidence and felt it simply wouldn't support i4's contract claim. R.
269. And contrary to i4's argument, the fact that Robertson's did not prevail on its
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contract claims does not ipso facto equal a determination that i4 did prevail. In fact,
Utah's appellate courts recognize that determining who is th0 prevailing party can be
problematic and there can be "circumstances where both, or heither, parties may be
considered to have prevailed." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, f 25; see Radman
v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ^27 n. 11 (rejecting the notion that there can be
only one prevailing party and upholding trial court determination that both parties
prevailed as well as noting the trial court's superior position to make such
determinations).
In this case, there was a contract and Robertson's had paid according to its terms.
R. 0233, 0276. However, even at the time of trial, well after a reasonable time had
passed, the website was not entirely completed. There was a substantial delay in its
development and the evidence was clear that Robertson's lost substantial business
because of the delay. See R. 294, Tr. p. 92. But Robertson's duty under the contract was
still not yet triggered and, therefore, the trial court correctly declined to find a breach by
Robertson's.
IV.

i4fs Analyses Regarding Prevailing Parties is| Incorrect.

At pages 4 - 10 of its opening brief, i4 argues a variety of bases contending it
should be found to be the prevailing party and, thus, entitled to attorney fees. Those
analyses are simply flawed; but irrespective of those flaws, i4l offers no support
whatsoever for the proposition that it should be awarded attorney fees under a contract,
where there is no finding that it prevailed on that contract. S&e Groberg v. Hous.
Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67 (upholding the failure tp award fees to a defendant
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where plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment were completely
defeated). Nonetheless, Robertson's addresses i4fs analyses in order.
A.

i4 Did Not Prevail Under the Contract.

i4 argues that it must be the prevailing party because it defeated Robertson's
contract claims and "authority across the county recognizes that a defendant is a
prevailing party when he defeats a plaintiffs claims." Op Br. p.p. 4 -5. This ignores the
fact that the trial court could easily have found, and apparently did find, that neither party
prevailed on its contract claims. In any event, it declined to find i4 prevailed. Supra.
Such a finding is in harmony with Utah case law, which has rejected "rigid applications"
and the "net judgment" rule as anything more than a starting point in determining
"which-if any—party was successful." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy,
2004 UT 47, f 25. Rather Utah has adopted a "flexible and reasoned approach to
deciding in particular cases who actually is the prevailing party." Radman v. Flanders
Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ^26 (citations omitted). Extraterritorial authority
notwithstanding, in Utah the determination of which party, if any, is a prevailing party, is
left to the trial court's sound discretion.
Moreover, it is puzzling why the trial court resorted to unjust enrichment in the
face of well-known precedent precluding that relief where a contract exists (addressed
below in Counter-Appeal). However, labels aside, when one analyzes the net effect of
the trial court's decision, it applied an equitable remedy that neither party requested. In
the end, the trial court reformed the contract and then ordered specific performance of its
version.
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First, the trial court reduced i4fs contractual duties by (removing the missing
calculator from its contract duties and by allowing significant extra time for i4fs
performance. Then, it reduced the contract price for the omitted calculator and reduced it
again because there was already such a delay in i4?s actual performance. Robertson's was
ordered to pay this adjusted amount.
But Robertson's didn't have the website in any normal sense, and there was a
contract. So unjust enrichment cannot apply. Moreover, the trial court found that i4 had
to "take any further steps necessary to tender all rights to the website it created to
[Robertson's] if it has not already done so." This had the effect of giving i4 still more
time to perform under the contract, but still ordering it to perform under the trial court's
reformed contract.5 In short, the trial court concluded that i4 needed to complete its
reformed contractual performance.
Robertson's concedes this may be a novel view of the trial court's ultimate
decision. But it is accurate as to the net result, and accentuates the practical difficulties in
assessing which party prevailed at trial and under what theory. Under this view though,
it was Robertson's that prevailed based on contract, and Robertson's, not i4, would likely
be entitled to fees.

^Notably this last step should not be necessary for recovery under unjust enrichment.
That doctrine requires that the benefit already be conferred and no further tender should be
required.
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B.

There May Be Simultaneous Winners or Losers With no Party
Prevailing.

i4 argues that the "Court must pick a winner" because two parties cannot
simultaneously prevail and that under Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117
(Utah 1998) "there can be only one prevailing party." Op. Br. p. 6. By i4's logic, there
can be no "draws," which is simply wrong. As a general premise it has been rejected by
this Court in the context of statutory provisions for attorney fees (A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73), as well as contractual provisions for
attorney fees. Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351. So it is "entirely
appropriate, when adequately supported by the facts, to conclude, as the trial court did
here, that there is no prevailing party." Whipple, 2002 UT App 73, ^[18. In fact,
numerous cases result in "draws" where there are simultaneous "winners," simultaneous
"losers" or simply no winners. For example, in Bonneville Distrib. Co. v. Green River
Dev. Assocs., 2007 UT App 175, where both parties defaulted, the trial court applied the
discretion and common sense called for in Whipple and so found that neither party was
entitled to attorney fees. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) was
perhaps more like this case because there, neither party was in default, and the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the determination that neither was entitled to attorney fees.
Also, i4fs concept that "there can be only one prevailing party" is a partial quote,
limited in its application and is not a holding that can be applied here.6 i4 relies on
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, in which both sides obtained some monetary

6

And although the phrase appears in several cases, Meadowbrook, is not one of them.
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relief in contract against the other. Mountain States, 783 P.2ft 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
But in Mountain States, this Court was reviewing specific contract language, which
referred to "the prevailing party" and so the phrase must be yiewed in that context.
Consequently, the more complete statement of this Court's nfiling there is as follows:
under the provision at issue, there can be only one prevailing party even
though both plaintiff and defendant are awarded monqy damages on claims
arising from the same transaction.
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 556 (emphasis added). Moreover, this Court noted in
Mountain States, itself, that in some cases both sides could bfc entitled to entitled to some
attorneys' fees if the agreement did not employ the same phraseology. Id. citing Trayner
v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per curiam).
i4 analogizes this case to Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co., v Ross., 849
P.2d 1187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) claiming that, as in Equitably, it incurred fees defending
against Robertson's breach claim. Op. Brief p.8. But no matter how many ways i4
couches it, to be awarded fees pursuant to a contractual provision, somewhere the trial
court must have found that i4 won on the contract issues. Furthermore, Equitable
involved claims for breach and recision of the same contract leased on unilateral mistake.
In other words, both were claims on the contract at issue. Sinfiply put, Equitable was
successful on its contract claims; i4 was not.
C.

i4 Had no Breach of Contract Claim Because There Was no Breach.

i4 argues that the "trial court also ruled in its final judgment that i4 also met each
of the elements of its breach of contract claims." Op. Brief p. 9. That is simply untrue.
For i4 to meet all the elements for breach of contract, the triall court had to find that
21

Robertson's breached the agreement. The trial court made no such finding and was
correct in declining to do so. Supra.
D.

Attorney Fees Are Not Awarded For Prevailing in Unjust
Enrichment.

One problem with most of i4's analyses is that they presume a substantive
difference necessarily arises based on who files first. In that world, it is important for i4
that its claims are couched as defensive, thereby "defeating" Robertson's initial contract
claim rather than standing on their own merits. Utah law, however, disfavors a
substantive difference based on who files first (or in this case, last). See CCD, L.C. v.
Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ^j 28 (noting the Utah Supreme Court's wariness "of embracing
statutory interpretations that confer legal rights based on victories in races to the
courthouse").
Nonetheless, to support its position that the race to the courthouse is important, i4
casts its net to federal court in Illinois for the case of Tax Track Systems Corp. v New
Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2007). Op. Brief p. 9 -10. In Tax Track,
plaintiff, Tax Track, filed suit on four claims, one of which was breach of contract;
Defendant, NIW, counterclaimed for breach of contract and quantum meruit. On
summary judgment the trial court dismissed all the parties' claims and awarded NIW
attorney fees and costs, which was affirmed on appeal. i4 now analogizes itself to the
defendant there, NIW, claiming Tax Track supports its position because NIW's
counterclaims were noted as defensive and compulsory. i4 claims it should also get fees
because its claims were also defensive and compulsory and they also defeated
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Robertson's claims.
Tax Track, however, is not only non-binding, it is distinguishable. In Tax Track,
the trial court had determined that "NIW defeated all of Tax [Track's claims" which
necessarily included those based on the contract - in other wc|)rds, NIW prevailed on
contract. That is not what happened here and is not what thei trial court found. In Utah
the prospect of a draw is clearly available and here the trial court was of the opinion that
no party prevailed regarding contract claims. By the same token, the trial court in Tax
Track was apparently of the opinion that NIW prevailed on it[s contract claims.
V.

Public Policy Does Not Compel Awarding Attorney Fees to i4.

i4 argues that sound public policy militates in favor awarding attorney fees "to a
prevailing party who has negotiated to receive them (particularly a defendant) and who
has proven non-liability for claims asserted against him." Op}. Brief p. 10. i4 asserts that
innocent defendants need "the ability to escape attempts to extort them."7 However, i4
gives no real reason why business defendants need any more [protection than plaintiffs
who have been damaged by defendants. And often as not, defendant status hinges of i4fs
"race to the courthouse" not the merits of a case. In short, i4ffe policy argument is not a
policy argument at all. There is no broad application and the |claim is simply subjective

7

No doubt, i4fs mischaracterization of the suit as Ian "attempt to extort" results
from the natural tendency of litigants to vilify the opponent. However, the simple fact is, and
the trial court found, i4 delayed in not performing under the contract, although it eventually
created a website. Nonetheless, Robertson's did not have that website even long after the
summer boat sales season had passed and it suffered damages as a result of the delay. Under
those circumstances, i4 should not be too surprised if Robertson's felt i4 had not performed
and wanted its money back.
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and particular to i4's view of this case.
Moeover, tools already exist to protect defendants and curb extortionate lawsuits.
Among them is the Utah statute that provides for attorney fees where an action or defense
is not in good faith. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008). Another is the statute on
which i4 bases some of its claim, Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-826 (2008). It provides that a
trial court "may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action
based upon any promissory note, written contract. . . when the provisions . . allow at least
one party to recover attorney fees.'5 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008). Contrary to
i4fs contentions though, it does not provide for recovery of attorney fees just because
there may be a contract involved in the case - and no case says that. Biut it does serve the
laudable purpose of, and was designed to level the playing field by dispensing with onesided attorney fees provisions:
The statute levels the playing field by allowing both parties to recover fees
where only one party may assert such a right under contract, remedying the
unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many contracts of adhesion.
In addition, this statute rectifies the inequitable common law result where a
party that seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has
a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the
contract. The former could demand attorney fees if successful, while the
latter could not.
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, |18 (portions omitted, decided under former identical
statute Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5).
No doubt there are more tools addressing i4Ts policy concerns. But at least one is
the case law discussed in the very cases i4 cites, but ignores. That is the "flexible and
reasoned approach" for determining who were prevailing parties, as first described in
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Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551(l|tah Ct. App. 1989). It has
since been applied in a variety of contexts for both statutory) and contractual bases for
attorney fee awards. "Essentially, this approach emphasizes 'the notion that courts should
not ignore common sense when deciding which party prevailed.'" SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol,
Inc., 2008 UT App 31, If 11 (quoting J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2007 UT App 88,19,
in turn quoting Whipple, 2004 UT 47, % 11, 94 P.3d 270). The policy tools are in place
and the trial court applied them properly.

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAR

On Cross Appeal Robertson's disputes the legal and factual underpinning of the
trial court's determination that i4 prevailed on a theory of unjust enrichment and argues
that the Court of Appeals should award Robertson's attorney fees on appeal.
I.

Unjust Enrichment Does Not Apply Because There is an Express
Contract

Unjust enrichment is an equitable restitutional remedy that applies when a party
"has and retains money or benefits which injustice and equity belong to another . . . . "
American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996)
(citations omitted). However, the remedy of unjust enrichment is not available if a
remedy is available at law. "If a legal remedy is available, si^ch as breach of an express
contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. 'Recovery in
quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject
matter of the litigation.'" American Towers Owners Ass'n v. (JCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182,
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1193 (Utah 1996) (quoting Mann v. American W, Life Ins, Co,, 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah
1978)).
Here, the trial court found that there was a contract or "agreement" and
Robertson's had paid according to its terms. R. 233, 276. That agreement expressly
covered the subject matter of the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, the trial court
erred in granting judgment based on unjust enrichment. See Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d
666, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (trial court "does not have the authority to ignore existing
principles of law in favor of its view of the equities").
Robertson's submits that because of this error and because the trial court declined
to find for i4 on contract, or find that any party prevailed on contract, the trial court
should have simply dismissed as to all parties and claims.8 But Robertson's has had to
face i4's appeal, which necessarily is based entirely on the written contract. The trial
court may have declined to find that either party prevailed on its contract claims at trial.
It does not follow, however, that fees should not be considered for Robertson's on this
appeal.
II.

Robertson's Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees Because I4's Appeal Is
Based on the Contract

Robertson's had chosen not to appeal because, frankly, the amount of money at
issue simply wasn't worth it and no overarching principal was at stake. i4, however,
chose to appeal solely on the issue of attorney fees under the contract and virtually

8

An appropriate substantive result here would be reversing the trial court's ruling on
unjust enrichment with remand for dismissal and orders consistent with the reversal.
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nothing else.9 See Op. Brief generally. Having done so, i4 should be ordered to pay
Robertson's attorney fees incurred in this appeal because, as shown above, Robertson's
prevails as against all i4!s arguments.
In Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a contract includes a provision for
payment of attorney fees to the prevailing party, if the actioil is brought to enforce the
contract, it applies on appeal as well, stating as follows:
The parties here agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fies if it became
necessary to enforce the contract. If plaintiff is required to defend its
position on appeal at its own expense plaintiffs rights under the contract are
thereby diminished. We therefore adopt the rule of law that a provision for
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by
the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to
enforce the contract, and overrule Swain and Downey \State Bank on this
point insofar as they may be to the contrary.
Mgmt Sews. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 4Q9 (Utah 1980) (referring to
Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., 279 P.2d 109 (Utah 1955) mid Downey
State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1^76)).
Admittedly, this holding has been applied largely in cases where the prevailing
party below was awarded or entitled to fees at trial and was successful on appeal. E.g.
Mgmt Servs, (supra)', Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988). But the language of
Mgmt Servs, is fairly clear, and its reasoning applies with eq^al force to this case. Even
though based on the trial court's ruling, no party was entitled Ito attorney fees, i4's appeal

9

It states " I agree to pay all collection costs, including court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees if collection is required." R. 206.
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for attorney fees is just such an "action . . .brought to enforce the contract." Id. Indeed, it
can only be properly based on the contract's attorney fee provision.
In Mgmt Servs., the Court reasoned that that "if plaintiff is required to defend its
position on appeal at its own expense plaintiffs rights under the contract are thereby
diminished." Thus, if fees will not be awarded for the successful defense of an appeal
where only the attorney fees due under a contractual provision for such fees is involved,
that successful party loses the benefit of the contractual provision both parties relied on.
Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1988), illustrates this. In Dixon, the
plaintiff sued to recover money due under a promissory note, which contained a provision
for attorney fees. The trial court "granted plaintiffs summary judgment but declined to
grant them attorney fees incurred in the collection of the note." Dixon , 765 P.2d at 881
(Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court held the trial court erred in failing to award fees at
trial and plaintiff received fees for the appeal as well. But if that case had been slightly
different and held that plaintiff was not entitled to fees, defendant would have been
manifestly disadvantaged by the difference in their respective positions on the attorney
fee issue. That's because fees were the only issue and if plaintiff succeeded on appeal,
defendant would be faced with paying both its fees and plaintiffs. On the other hand, if
defendant succeeded, plaintiff would not be faced with the similarly grim prospect of
paying both parties' attorney fees.
Utah statute addresses this potential inequity. It provides as follows:
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
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promissory note, written contract, or other writing allo^v at least one party
to recover attorney fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008). The statute's language in no way restricts its
application of this "leveling statute" to trial courts; And it is designed to remedy the
"unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many contracts" under which one party
could get fees while the other could not. Bilanzich v. Lonetti,\ 2007 UT 26, ^[18 {supra).
Even though under the leveling statute, the parties should stand on equal footing, unless
possibility of awarding attorney fees goes both ways on appeal, one party ill always be
disadvantaged and their contractual rights diminished.
Here, as in Dixon, the trial court failed to award any party fees, but i4 is once again
claiming it prevailed on the contract and, as in Dixon, is seeking only attorney fees based
on the contractual language. Robertson's is now forced to defend its position, and if i4
were to prevail, it would be awarded fees for the appeal as w0ll as remand to the trial
court for fees incurred at trial. But if attorney fees are not similarly due to Robertson's
for defending this appeal, its contractual rights are diminished because it simply would
not be on an equal footing vis-a-vis the contract's attorney fe^ provision. Mgmt Sen's.,
617 P.2d at 409 (Utah 1980). In fact, if i4 and similar parties, who seek only attorney
fees on appeal, are not faced with paying the other party's attorney fees, every opposing
would be disadvantaged and the salutary purposes of the leveling statute and the ruling
from Mgmt Servs., are subverted.
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III.

The Factual Findings do Not Support The Legal Conclusion That
Robertson's Was Unjustly Enriched.

Under Utah law the conclusions of law must "find support in, and arise out of, the
findings of fact." Needham v. First Nat. Bank, 85 P.2d 785 at 787, 96 Utah 432 (Utah
1938) (citations omitted); Utah R. Civ. P. 52:
Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court find facts specially in all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate the "mind of the
court," and must resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the
conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon. Furthermore, failure of a trial
court to enter adequate findings requires the judgment to be vacated.
Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 673 P.2d 590 at 601 (Utah 1983). With respect to unjust
enrichment, in addition to the lack of an express contract, three elements are required:
[1] a benefit conferred by one person on another. [2] [t]he conferee must
appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. [3] [Acceptance or retention
by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its
value.
Allen v. Ball, 2006 UT 70, ^|26 (citing Desert Miriah Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83,
^{13, 12 P.3d 580 (portions omitted). Here, however, the trial court failed to find those
elements - that is, it failed to specifically find a benefit was conferred by i4 upon
Robertson's; it failed to find that Robertson's appreciated or had knowledge of the
benefit; and third, it failed to find an acceptance or retention of any benefit by
Robertson's.10
As to unjust enrichment, the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

10

Robertson's concedes that had it received the website and kept it, it would have been
inequitable for it not to have paid the value thereof.
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are sparse. Reviewing them as a whole shows that they mafce general findings about
things that i4 did, but they say precious little about what if atiy benefit Robertson's
received or knew about. The Findings of Fact noted that i4 ^performed these services by
completing the majority of the work on the website." R. 27$ f 5. The context indicates
that "these services" related to the contract, however, and d0es not indicate that it was a
benefit that was actually conferred upon Robertson's. The Findings then noted that the
"website allowed [Robertson's] to change . .. or replace items anytime [Robertson's]
desired" and Latin text was there simply to show areas wher£ changes could be made. R.
276 ^f 8. Finally, the Findings state that Robertson's "was notified and instructed on how
to make these additions, changes, amendments, etc, [sic] by to employee of Defendant."
R. 276 ^[10. From there, the Conclusions of Law summarily State i4 "has proven the
elements of of its claim for unjust enrichment." R. 277 ^12.
These findings, however are inadequate to "clearly incjicate the 'mind of the court'
and, likewise are insufficient to 'resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the
conclusions of law and judgment'" that Parks v. Zions First Mat. Bank, (supra.) requires.
A.

There Is No Finding That a Benefit Was| Conferred.

Notably absent from all this was what the actual benefit was that Robertson's
received. That is, there is no finding or proper evidence that Robertson's actually
received the website and the administrative password to use it. The mere fact that i4
completed the majority of the work on the website does not confer a benefit on
Robertson's. The website may have allowed Robertson's (an# in fact, anyone with the
password) to change or manipulate the website, which could conceivably confer a benefit
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on someone. But that's only true if that someone has the password. For a similar reason
Robertson's received no benefit from being notified and instructed on how make to make
such changes. Without the password, Robertson's couldn't actually make any changes
and so received no benefit. It was left with a website that looked just like the one
presented at trial - with text in Latin and pictures of old boats, none of which it could
change. That is simply not a benefit, and to the extent such a site was accessible on the
internet, it would actually be a detriment.
By way of analogy, if i4 had been building Robertson's a special car, and had most
of it built, that in itself would not confer a benefit. Similarly, Robertson's would not be
benefitted from mere instruction on how to operate its special features. To have a benefit
conferred, Robertson's had to have the car, the knowledge, and the key. In this case, the
findings show Robertson's had knowledge that there was a car, and some instruction on
how it could use the car. Yet even at the time of trial, it had neither the car, nor the keys.
No doubt, this is why the trial court ordered i4 to "take any further steps necessary to
tender all rights and access to the website if it has no already done so." R. 277 ^18. But
such a conclusion is inconsistent with the theory of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment
occurs when a party "has and retains money or benefits which injustice and equity
belong to another .. .." American Towers Owners Assfn v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182,
1192 (Utah 1996) (additional citations omitted). It is not based on the value of the benefit
the conferee will have; it is based on what the conferee already has.
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B.

There is No Finding That Robertson's appreciated or Had
Knowledge of the Benefit.

Admittedly Robertson's knew there was a website beipg created. But the fact that
a website is being created is not itself a benefit, so knowledge of that fact cannot be
knowledge of a benefit. Rather a benefit would be a website that was operational and that
Robertson's had full access to with a password. There is however, no finding that
Robertson's had knowledge or appreciation of such a benefit| In fact, the words
"knowledge, know, appreciate, etc." don't even appear in th$ Findings. Robertson's
realizes those aren't necessary "magic words," but the best tljat can be said from the
Findings is that they state that Robertson's "was notified and instructed on how to make
these additions, changes to the website." That is a finding of knowledge of how to do
something. But absent knowledge of the password as well, it cannot be a finding of the
knowledge of the benefit.
C.

There is no Finding That Robertson's Accepted or Retained a
Benefit.

Third, the trial court is required to find that Robertson]s accepted or retained the
benefit of the website. Unjust enrichment occurs when a paity "has and retains money or
benefits which injustice and equity belong to another . . . ." ^ee American Towers
Owners Ass'n v. CCIMeck, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (supra., additional
citations omitted). There simply is no such finding and, indeed, the evidence was that
Robertson's had not approved the website. A finding that Robertson's "was notified and
instructed on how to make these additions, changes, amendments, etc, [sic] by an
employee of Defendant" (R. 276 If 10) is not a finding of either acceptance or retention.
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Nor is a finding that the "website allowed Plaintiff to change or modify it." In point, the
trial court's conclusion that i4 should tender remaining rights and access to the website is
inconsistent with a finding that Robertson's accepted or retained anything. That is
especially true given that this ruling came years later at trial and the website was still not
fully complete.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's ruling denying attorney fees in favor of i4 should be upheld.
Attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by contract or statute. The trial court
properly did not award fees to i4 because it declined to find i4 prevailed in contract. On
appeal, i4 fails to properly present its case, which requires it to marshal evidence to show
the trial court should have found that Robertson's breached the contract. The evidence
was clear that Robertson's did not breach.
However, the trial court's judgment in favor of i4, which was based on unjust
enrichment, must be reversed. Unjust enrichment is not available as remedy where, as
here, an express contract exists. Also, the trial court failed to make proper findings of
fact to support a conclusion that Robertson's was unjustly enriched. Finally, the only
issue raised by i4 is attorney fees due under the contract. In such a case, proper
interpretation of statute, case law and sound policy dictate that Robertson's and similar
parties should be awarded attorney fees as a prevailing party.
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DATED this J2S^ day of June, 2009.
McINT

RICHARD K^OipEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee and CrossAppellant (Robertson's)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the

of June, 2009,1 caused a tme and correct copy of

the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT to be mailed by
first class mail to the following:
Steven L. Rinehart
Steven Rinehart. LLC
707 West 700 South, Suite 201
Woods Cross, Utah 84087
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Addendum 1
Defendant I4's Trial Exhibit #2

<5>
14 Solutions

Robertsons Marine

DEFENDANT'S]

SITE SPECS
BROWSER CAPABILITY
Your website wlV be compatible with both Internet Explorer and Netscape, for bbth Windows and Macintosh.
However, tne administrative portion o'the website (the portion used to control and make changes to the site)
may only be compatible with the latest version of Internet Explorer for Windows

PAYMENT OPTIONS
Fo< your convenience, ?4 Solutions offers two payment options:
•

50/50: You pay 50% of the total website cost at the time of signing, arid the remaining 50% when
the site has been completed and approved.
Web Leasing^ You can make six (6) payments over a period of sue {£j months The initial payme nt
is due at the time of signing Monthly payment amounts for each we-bsjitc component are irsted
below tne total component amount

DESIGN AGREEMENT
Before starting the graphic design of your site, we require that you complete b Design Agreement so that
we will bettet understand your company, your brand image, and the customers prid businesses that wilt use
your sjle.

PROOFING PROCESS
Unless otherwise noted, aft graphic design proofs are pubfrdy posted in the Our Work section on w w w y f t ^ .
AH tame frames discussed are based upon »4 receiving feedback on design proofs within 2 A hours of posting
In some instances, programming may begin prior to final approval of the graphic elements of the site design.
With some srte types, programming may be dependent on the graphic design

COMPONENT SELECTiON
14 Solutions components are moduiar. You can select the options thai best fit trje needs of your current
business. You are not limited or restricted to the items provided in this quote. If you have items that are oot
}i$ied in Ims quote and would tike to know exact priding, please contact your salens representative. Some
components have more than one option or variation of a service fisted. 14- Solutions works strictly with the
final order agreement options selected, i4 w# verify with client the specified components desired before
completing work on behalf of client

IBUflLDER™ (website management toot)
This exclusive tool vviH allow you to keep your website effective and up-to-date, ivlost standard protocot tor
making a change to a website requrres multiple time consuming steps Meanwhile, you are stuck with a site
that has content that you don't like and want changed.
Builder puts you in total control Simply tog into the "beck endv of your site and Use our customized iBuiids-r
menu to make the a d d o n s or changes you need This also means you are in charge of the tnifca! tnputoi
your data. You can change the text content on the pages Bnd the images that arte displayed You witl neve.-r
have to pay someone to make those changes, either Everything goes in exactly the way you want it You
are the winner by saving time and money

SITE DESIGN
Our professional destqners and programmers wff worl together with you to create youi website Sue design
ts much rno e than simp}), seating a IOOK it is creaimg the basic functionality qf your website grid giving
your ^ue more life thai 3 simple image posted on the vveb Whiie other option^ increase \hs functional*!/ of
\our website 'he design is critical Site design includes the following
#
•
*
*
•
»

Homepage de^iqn
Header BTK\ footeis ihat will be present on even, page ot), oui site tyjna all ot your pages together
and creatirq 3 constant look arvd feet
Me^ii and navigation bars that take into cons idera1 ion mterfdi*B de&tgti to ensure maximum
usability G your weosite
Slicing of the site design allowing for HTML iriegrat on to make the pultons on your website
tompieteh functional
r
vtng the stfe design into the database which makes the site become imo r e than just an image
Database dnver pages t4" at diiow \,Q\J to make enanges to selected features and pdit the content
of he website.

Our team wa-tts to ensjre Ihal <OP site look* and ieeis exacUy the vmv that you Iwani if ts easy io navigatt
and W4^ berve a purpose on ine .vob Yuu wrtt be vttfr- us ever/ step of the wav and nothing w $ be oo&teu
vuthout your express approval

Stte Design and iBmJder $1500 00
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STANDARD SITE COMPONENTS

^-^

PRODUCTS
Displacing and selling your products online ran dramatically increase voir revenue This paqe would slbvv
you to display your products directly on your websrie Your products can b& broken down into mu'tiple
caiegories wriich assist customers *nfindingexactly tvhai the, are fooking for ro r each product you will De
able to drsplay a Trtie Description and Price with the option to upioad ar image of the product This pane
*rlt be compteiely diabase driven allowing you to add edit and remove product with ease
Websrte reference wwvi lazyqays rorri

e w RV Search
Fuel

Class
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Make
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RV SEARCK

Search nev u$ec length p*tref type color
Create and edrt categories/remove categories curen categories Glas[tron Ranger Crestlmer
Ranger will have a hnl* to the bjrfd your boat option 01 wwv ranoerboatjs com
New Boatb
Usea Boats
SpectaL SecUun

Wher displayed iength type engine color stock # and MSRP
Standard options
Opitnnai options Ihts will allow the user lo djcf on items and the suogs^ted price will change
1 Larqe image wito 8 thumbnail images
Price
LtnKs lo manufacturers
Print page

Request mforma ion o** this produc1 torn

f.

Products Page $1500 00
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NEWS/PRESS RELEASES/CALENDAR OF EVENTS/WITH EVENTS BANNED
This area will aJJow you to dispiay yoiir company^ achievements and feaiures in med'a This database
driven s&cUoo will allow you to add articles and features, include short descriptions of each and attach an
image of your choice A calendar is a good way for your clients to easily Jog or) to your website and vie*v tie
events you have plannati for the future Jhp calendar wrll be s visual represenfafooi i or a simple calendar
>ou will OB able to add sho4 \ti\cs lo any day you vvish These titles WJII appear as a bni to event details on
the day you have chosen for the event
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HEWS RELEASES
R A ^ - P " BOATS- N.£W LV5Q RE* FA lii A H f U^i UTILITY" F1UH V *>LAV BOAT WITH Al L T H F COMFQKr
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News/Press Rel&ases/Cal^ndar of Hvents. $1000,00

BKVNTRS WOULD NEED TO Bl> CREATED ON AN ^NDIMDlfAL BASIS
S100.00/HR

{t PARTS AND SERVICE
This page wll describe all of the services your firm offers presented in an easy Icj read professional layout
You w.3' have ihe ability to add an image a1" yojr choice, and modify the iext as needed using ihe jBtnlder
too
•
Contact Pans and Servrce
• toforrnaiion about Service Department
P^rts and Services, $350.00

Laryday$„.
Number One in RV Service'
Local 313.246 4555
To!! Free 800.282 7£00

Atf lazychys Service Is Always Part Df The
"o &eep voir ^X n^mncj ewiOoWv sr^ l u * r v - pond r tru«Lazy Day^io f f ugh * "He Tirss t*ne Q.J c o w ^ m e f i i t c i n e
P'-ope- se»ivt>ig JUP your cwtch be^-ns wtfh eyensive and ongosng sadism tranrr- erf OLTPVIA^VDA CerUficd Teirv ICIJ^E,
V»sn rnp- o* oa 22o ^er v^e bs%. -^d yoi "1 cjsf r«sLfcs ATC* *th exs muh-mjBar Gats'-psrl& encj accesswtev JK'errsry
ii »fov iifC^s; ^atriJIr o r n r - srecial susper^itn 37 I r m s or A~*3te^5r vcr,ir ^ w i d ^ a r s
/JO'"/ In VOL r fnaicrja
•
•
»
•
*•
+
•
«

v^e can do t and tficiud&r

2*. J >i*Mi$efca*$ comop^d t J f-.«-rtJk any Pv *epa r u *vai ranrty wort
Direct Ja ^JT , rimnksnl'Mftan vUh -full-time orv-sEte wa^ont^ r^recerrsJt-n bj, S p v w n ape Cantmsis;sO is i
Lez Days ejfn?ffl> ^ c w f AOtecnncj&nt srvs s*oponnei s t e f t t *e vce yajr P fts~^s
Futr- eq Jippt.d csbr«l storr eapabfe of canaete csbnet tebuBi a id iFiieao) +<>&t end ? t r . '^sting
Full +w/ic~ p«»n a~«d br^jv r&c#y eq jppeo to *tsncfefezrtfi Ji-erjwss ancf awmnum *epa|r ?
»f «i u t : r custom & j ntau sna ai'brucrh murals tfcet v*ii r ^ e ^ou **v jexra $»>eck*
Ltcyc« rc is en-author ui-eci Pre^or ?&ctor pa rt center
Ci 1 stair- u N h r art p^rr tociS'v' otJ-1 b Utree Jieatsd 6^ J o w i cran pant CK}Q11«
£ ^ J--VC bfkF* oen i>ec! Cur on* ^ there are 90 Cem-ecl RV Ischmcttr* i'> rb« wa £0 &i which e^e twri? io serve

<*) ABOUT US

Y.

f a k e the opportunity 1o faniilrarize yourself with' your potential ciients by presenting your mission statement
onthis.page. You can describe how the s\le was founded and.by whom, expiaiiji the benefits your services
enables and describe what makes your srte:sa unique and:creative. This page-will becomptetefy databasedriver) so you canedit the content atiany time,
A t o u i U s ; $250>O0

Company Histoix.
\Th>i:Uzyddyr< Acivontcge-j

The Dream Becomes Reality^:
Don vv&fcwr-e is-president •{riifiz world's largest sricfls-sjt'e
Rbcr-eotbnal VeHidedeatastwp,Lsrydsys RV-Center'•
located tri Sfcfthe?,.ft-sutiartri cxrfnmunily,of Tampa, Florida. A
Tennesse-e rja*}\'e.-,"Djn.Ti«ved:w-Flo::ids. as e.'teenaijsr end
finished schccl in T&hpsteeftar-fcr.eturrtr>oto T.eurtes.see.to
term for fifeirfe'.iu'w w#rs. Don. Who hstftoVenup pyincfas
aiziTiW .pa-sferie; then t u r n e d -to T6mpa to start- a landscape

|
Partlythro-u^h^hs-hisownRV.DonbejsjahiD viewRecreafohsi venues JBSa^o\^hinddsfrj-..'Heappr.oached:h&
t&Uiei"., Hft~&nd &r-5'ferRon,-v^h life K»ejS,OJ"-S£9rtB1ii;errR.>/;;«te.eitershfe3..The-.onsiisfel.bMSin«=;^:-pian'-:v*?isl£:ie:.»Jl-two;•
jVatef^'ti fnoru>; Don sistes.-.^ye ws^e-^'c»y:«plG^h5therj|ght--inwket vfes. We-trad no idee Start Tsmpa-'yv^s'sufchjfrpre&T.prace iD cjoimo b-y?lnes&. '^.ti'ter^ rsstii&.ihat 5 omeny people came down here:>::fhe .Wini«j* and-we c&M.
fontee tft&. ttifrtecai in&i'keiftaefnevei:-'bs^touc*^..Wt=^ju^'*Fie.^*th^.:i;- >v;i; Yvork.^rJ b:Xd.;yp^'ci be ^successful;*'

Original Location
The oriai'ia' Laiydays RV Center .de^rsftp-operiec: [is doors hi S78 mri'coniisted -oi:aff^4i5i>3iTien&stled:on:&1,75:
sere ste, t*vc. triv^juater-s frtavsnysr y'-aria 1-500 i-: capita*. At/the end of their f ir.styea: in .fcukiness they purcr^seG'the icfiheybache^nIsastfig-«rid'ih&bushc^c^irjy^
trails ©
tnonif >:ttiet frs:ys«r';l.f.i7.y.ciays-stayedwrthf::aVfcHra3fc:'S-enci hMtf taV^^1^1^n-9$r-N'tfhi^:th£:y verttufetio^'MtQ
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CONTACT US
This page watiid have contact: information ifOrytwrc-^pa'ny, such as-theiocaiioiti'.iof .your off ice.,-telephone;
•numbers and extensions, fax-number, and -.email addresses. This page; .will -he database driven, so it will be
easy for you to change i? you move or change your contact mformaiton in anothqrway. This will also .'be
broken up into three categories:
/

Sales

V-

Service.

*^

Ge.her-3.1 Infonfiation

Department Uslmg;
]&i&&toi&'l

Uii;:»;:»

'i&z''i»l LS£:y&*?.s:.- y ^ s r^g-ETsrif:tt :Lr5-;

GEUm&l

SALES
••:.::;:.;-:^" "V-':^:;:!:^-'."";:;^-.;;:
ftv:.!;^X-^<
Cvil.£i£;:2iu'^

:!' : i : ;.V:V'^M- .^L-' : '
;

:

;•.:• 'i;a->!C-v a;f'V ;:i^v^

:••••«•>:«•

-

•

>

• *

• : : • ! ; ; : •

^.-^•r^iM;- ;.:.£££•>«:(£
f-r-^gj-;^; 'x
R * ^ ?:*>••

te&mt>&.* £ *
••Ox-tt-rs'&>*?•*•.•

r'^J^f'jfj^y :?-».x=>t**:".
Odrftaot us standard; $300.00

CONTACT US EMAIL FORM

7r

FF(,»r visitors to yuur sue that

are us*ng public computers, t* can sometimes be more of a hassle than a help to
have an email link on your contact us page On public compters with no mart program this email link wrtf
not worK. and they mil have to iog into a web mail program like Hotmail

A ' contact us-1 ertia*l form eftminates the need to Jog into a ma if program or a w^b mail site Visitors to your
sue Simply U\\ out a form nghi on the contact us page of your website that contains fields for name,
telephone oiwnber, email address, preferred method of contact and comments
This form, wien submitted, WJJI be smarted direcfey to you You car then c e n t a l the vrsttor back v$a their
^referred method of contact

Contact Us Ernati Form: $550,00

BOAT GALLERY
A boat galley is u grea[ section to Keep people coming back to the site This section woulc allow visitors to
post send you irr>3ges of their ooats or adventures and have ^OJ post them on your website. You could ha^p
conies4 for me best photograph of their adventures Tnm would provide a sunpte form for the user to M out
mtormoiioR about themselves, contact information and a description oi the pboip The information would h3
sent to you to* approval before going hve on the v/ebsHe.
tJ'onejfctf' »vtftf- only cUtrucr ~
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Create categories
Gallery of Boats or Adventures
Sample 4e5c«pUve fom^ prowling oame, contact info and a ttescnpt»on|ct images
4 jmage upload
Boat Gallery: $800X0

j%

FINANCE CALCULATOR/CREDIT APPLICATION -

//

The finance calculator will a»ow visitors the abifjtv to see what the monthly payment would be on any particular- ooat tney wish to purchase by fitting m the speculed fields and grossing calculate
Purchase Price
Dovyn Payment
Dmp Down of Loan Terms
Interest Rate
Your monthly payment is $_

^
*, t *
C-szk.*c*U*jn\<^

/ ^ ^ • ^

II wdl albo oroide a credit application they can onm off and bring into the store, cj-r fax to your location.
Finance CaJciilator/C^edit Application: $600*00

ADDITIONAL SITE BOOSTERS
FLASH INTRODUCTION
1 h<s utilizes Ihe latest technology to allow you to display a short animated intra to get across the main points
of your organization to the visitors to vour siie This option inc udes Hash intro without sound This quote JS
only an estimate It is absoluteiv necessary that we vis't wrth ^ou in detail ahouf your flash intro The
amount of iroe jt takes to do a flash mtrc can vary dramatically
Flash m\ro without s o u n d : $750,00
Flasr) intro with sound* $950.00

TESTIMONIALS
Wnnen testimonials from actual site-users will allow you to platform toe quality and populanty of your site if
your clients wll allow you to you may also choose to upload an image with each testimony to define the
rear sense of satisfaction You wtil be able to add, edit and remove all toe text and images of your
Teshmon ate page at any time
Testlmonfals, $200 00

FAQ

*

Tirs page would have multiple questions and answers about your company, youjr concept and howrt wojrs
The page w&uld he formatted wrth a list of the questions at the top of the page vyhich would link to the
answe- down b d o * This allows customers who arc looking for answers to specific questions to find therr
quickly and eabily vvrthout hevno to scroff through the entire page Because yoijjrsite is database driven
you could easily acid edit or remove questions antf answers
FAQ-$200,80

X.

LINKS
Tn s page would have logos text, and a fink to companies ^ou are affteted with or other websites that
would oe useiul to yojr a cents or your customers Thts would be database dnven, so ?ou could aac or
remove fmks as you need
^ p ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Links: $200.00

EMPLOYMENT
An employment Dago ts an excellent resource for people who are interested tn wprfcino. for your company
This Dage would allow you to display the employee characteristics that you are looking for, and fob
openmgs For each job opening you vrould be able to dispia> the job title* description wage/salary and you
wojfd like an image
You could a»so upload 3 PDF o^ your employment application so that applicants 'can prmt it off at home a r d
till it out There would also be instruction* on this page far submitting appbeattons ano contacting the human
•^sources de.oanment a! Vitality This page would be completely database dnvenc so you could add edrt
and remove content arid job listings ft there are no current openings a message; will oe displayed mfomrmtg
visitors that ihere are no openings at this time, and asking them to check back at a later date
E m p l o y m e n t $300.00

*

TELL A FREIND
This Will allow for your curent visitors io recommend your site io their friends and family. People are usually
more iKely to respop^ to an email when rt comes to them with a friends or fannHylmember's name jn the
email

Tell a fnentf: $250,00

DATA ENTRY
You may find vourse*f with an excessive amount of products photos descnptjqns o? other forms of data thai
must bir entered into your s?(e This can set back your scheduled launch date postponing business you
uanf available I L your clients as soon as possible Let our team take over the tyurden for you Uitlmng oir
site content a^a'or photo enhancing sktfb we car maKe sure that your information i*> proofed and entered
accurateh
t»ata Entry S30 00 per hour

f

*

•

HTML NEWSLETTER
1 nis would make sending oi«< your newsletter a quick and easy task \Afe woufd icreate a forrr that had the
basir fjeids that you would Mke to mciude tn your newsletter, and would design the look and feel that you
wouJd fiko the end product to have You would simply have to fill in the hformalfon in the fields and hit
L
3 f td a m the newsletter would go oat to evervone in your mailing hst When the members of your mailing
list receded yJUi neASlettet i( v\ouJd oe cve-caichiFig and professional looking ywthout you eve- having to
write a singic line o\ HTML cooe
HTML Newsletter $500 00

MAILING LIST
This feature witl vookie' chejr browser \o see if they have been to your site beforp if tne^ have not been to
your«ie 'hey will b prompted to enrer fn their name and emai address Tt\ts will be optional aftovwng thorn
to rfechntr tc become a pen of vour mailing itst You the n VVF{| o&gir to gathe" a idrgc d a t a b l e of names and
ycu car serd tnem weekly or months spec taK free of cost to vou You have no |printing cost maiing cost
handling u>st and you can reach 3 greater market based upon signups
"You can log o n to you r site a* any time and at any place thai comems an imernel connection, and see hovv
many mdwduais have signed up, and what they are interested tn The data will tie contained in an access
database The information will be available for you to download the latest custonSer hst at-anytime

MEMBERSHIP REFERRAL PROGRAM
In order for virions to your site to use this program, they would have lo sagn up fbr the maihng hst to become
"members" of your sjte 0~>ce they do tbib they can go to a screen where they sijbmii the names and emo I
aadresses of fnends 1hal Ibey Think would be interested in the sito The database on your sste would keep
ir^ck cr th;s tnfornatior far each member tf someone that ? member recommenced *c your site <nsi*% and
signs up fo'the mailing list too, then the member s status rises and thoy can be rewarded with special
discounts or coupons* Members are rew&ided tor dnvjng peop'e to your site Whfen someone a member h«*s
recommended becomes a member the database will notify the anginal member IO update ihem on their
advanced status and urging them to come back and take advantage of their new deals You can dec icie at d
change wnat rewards to give member* who generate oris Trie database will track hew many new members
each membe r brtncjs ro the site and you can log m and view the list a' any time FThjs program JS one of themost effective vvavs lo drive people to vour stte and keep thern coming back
Membership Referral Program $750.00

PHOTOGRAPHY
Images are 3n integral part of every website They are used both in site desigrp arid to shew potential
customers what vour proaucts took hke If the images of the products on your $ite are pooriy done, ft will
appear thai your products are tow jn quality and customers will be tess likely tq make a purchase Our
profession.* pnolog^phers can do the photography for you, ensunr>g higrvquafity trnages that bnng out the
besi in your product Thev will travel to your *ocat*on to perform an on-srte shocjrt After the shoot, the
images become you*' property The images can be burned onto a compact chslj, or transferred to you via
email We offer two packages.
Package #1 $275.00
•
30 photos shot

•

Up i d 1/2houis

•

Travel up to 5Q miles from Salt Lake City

Package #2: $400,00
•
80 photos shot
Up to 3 hours
Travel up to 50 rmtes- from Sail Lake City

CONTENT DEVELOPMENT
Everr the must sophisticated web designs lose tne*r fmpaci vtfian the content as JDooriy wntten or organized
Some companies just do not have the m-house resources to create content lha\ holps them shine 14
Sol unions content deveiouers have over 15 years of sxpenence wnfrng and editing everything from
advertising \o teenmea: copy to creative content. Let our content dex^etopers partner with you to make your
Weo sHe do wnar you need it io do

Content Development: $65/hr

EMAIL CONFIGURATION
in Dusmess, you can't afford fo miss out on important information This makes switching main- email
addresses both tncky and a httte frightening Our consultants WJJJ come on-site tb your business to set up
your email accounts and get your OtEtJook or Outlook Express programs set up \o receive emajt from your
new address. We will time the transfer so thai you don't loose any emails that cpula be vitat to the success
of v o i r business Let us take vie sS'e-ss out of this change
Email Configuration: $[75 {for up t o 5 compiut&rs)
$15 p c additional computer

